IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

 

Application Serial No. 11/736,356

 

Filed: 04/17/2007                                                                  

 

For: SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SAFELY FLYING UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IN CIVILIAN AIRSPACE

 

Examiner: Ronnie M. Mancho                                   Art Unit: 3664

 

In re Application of:  Jed Margolin        

 

 

Mail Stop Appeal Brief - Patents

Commissioner for Patents

P.O. Box 1450

Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

 

Sir,

Reply Brief to Examiner’s Answer

 

            Appellant (“Margolin”) files his Reply Brief to Examiner’s Answer to Margolin’s Appeal Brief. This Reply is timely filed within two months of the September 14, 2011 mailing date of Examiner’s Answer. In this Reply the term “Margolin” refers to the Appellant. The term “Margolin ‘724” refers to U.S. Patent 5,904,724 Method and apparatus for remotely piloting an aircraft issued May 18, 1999 to Margolin. (In his Answer the Examiner uses the term “Margolin” to refer to Margolin ‘724, which is confusing.) The term “Duggan” refers to U. S. Patent Application 20050004723, Duggan et al. inventors, published January 6, 2005.

 


I.   Status of Claims

 

            The Application as filed included claims 1-14.

 

            Claims 1-14 have been twice-rejected in the Office Action of February 15, 2011. Claims 1-14 are being appealed.

 


II.   Grounds of Rejection to be Reviewed on Appeal

 

A.   Claims 1-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent  5,904,724 (‘724) to Margolin (the same Margolin as the Appellant) in view of Patent Publication US 2005004723 to Duggan.

 

B.  Whether Margolin had a duty to define the term “civilian airspace” or whether he was entitled to use the common meaning of the term.

 

C.   Whether Margolin had a duty to define “safety” or whether he was entitled to use the common meaning of the term; and whether Margolin defined a particular level of safety.

 

D.  Whether the Examiner’s assertion that “It is believed that the aircraft flown in the prior art is flown safely …” is proper.

 


III.   Argument

 

Margolin’s Reply

 

A.   The Examiner has set up a pro se Straw Man, and then knocked him down. The Examiner’s Straw Man is ignorant of (or confused by) Patent Law and USPTO Rules. The Examiner’s Straw Man has also ignored the Examiner’s wise and patient guidance.

 

The Examiner spent so much time on his Straw Man that he either forgot to discuss the real issues or he carelessly (or deliberately) mischaracterized them.

 

From Margolin’s Appeal Brief Page 15, lines 4-5:

The current invention is a new and unobvious use for U.S. Patent 5,904,724 Method and apparatus for remotely piloting an aircraft issued May 18, 1999 to Margolin.

 

The central issue is whether Margolin has the right to improve his own invention.

 

 

B.   Claims 1-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Margolin ‘724 in view of Duggan.

 

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C § 103(a):

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

 

In order for the Examiner to make a prima facie case of obviousness he must find all of the elements in a claim in either one reference or the other.

 

Margolin will present two examples here, but having argued all of the claims separately in his Appeal Brief, does not waive the right to present additional examples in the event it becomes necessary to file a 145 action in U.S. District Court (now the Eastern District of Virginia) and/or to go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

 

Margolin’s Claim 1 starts by describing a synthetic vision system such as the one taught by Margolin ‘724:

 

1.   A system for safely flying an unmanned aerial vehicle in civilian airspace comprising:

(a)   a ground station equipped with a synthetic vision system;

(b)   an unmanned aerial vehicle capable of supporting said synthetic vision system;

(c)   a remote pilot operating said ground station;

(d)   a communications link between said unmanned aerial vehicle and said ground station;

(e)   a system onboard said unmanned aerial vehicle for detecting the presence and position of nearby aircraft and communicating this information to said remote pilot;

 

And then adds the element:

 

whereas said remote pilot uses said synthetic vision system to control said unmanned aerial vehicle during at least selected phases of the flight of said unmanned aerial vehicle, and during those phases of the flight of said unmanned aerial vehicle when said synthetic vision system is not used to control said unmanned aerial vehicle said unmanned aerial vehicle is flown using an autonomous control system.

 

Margolin’s Claim 5 further limits the selected phases in which synthetic vision is to be used.

 

5.   A system for safely flying an unmanned aerial vehicle in civilian airspace comprising:

(a)   a ground station equipped with a synthetic vision system;

(b)   an unmanned aerial vehicle capable of supporting said synthetic vision system;

(c)   a remote pilot operating said ground station;

(d)  a communications link between said unmanned aerial vehicle and said ground station;

(e)  a system onboard said unmanned aerial vehicle for detecting the presence and position of nearby aircraft and communicating this information to said remote pilot;

 

whereas said remote pilot uses said synthetic vision system to control said unmanned aerial vehicle during at least selected phases of the flight of said unmanned aerial vehicle, and during those phases of the flight of said unmanned aerial vehicle when said synthetic vision system is not used to control said unmanned aerial vehicle said unmanned aerial vehicle is flown using an autonomous control system, and

 

whereas the selected phases of the flight of said unmanned aerial vehicle comprise:

(a)  when said unmanned aerial vehicle is within a selected range of an airport or other designated location and is below a first specified altitude;

(b)  when said unmanned aerial vehicle is outside said selected range of an airport or other designated location and is below a second specified altitude.

The Examiner asserts he found the new elements (in Claim 1 and Claim 5 respectively) in both Margolin ‘724 and Duggan. Margolin believes he has successfully refuted the Examiner’s assertion in Margolin’s Appeal Brief. For Claim 1 see page 15, line 13 - page 22, line 12. For Claim 5 see Margolin Appeal Brief page 23, line 13 - page 28, line 41.

 

In brief, the Examiner asserted he found the new elements in the current invention in a Margolin ‘724 drawing showing the synthetic vision system. He asserts he found the new elements in Duggan by citing impossibly long passages. The only passages in Duggan that are even remotely relevant are the ones that relate to synthetic vision:

[0356] a synthetic vision display

 

[0388] In one aspect of the present invention, synthetic vision display technical approach of the present invention is based upon integrating advanced simulated visuals, originally developed for training purposes, into UAV operational systems. In accordance with one embodiment, the simulated visuals are integrated with data derived from the ground control station during flight to enable real-time synthetic visuals.

 

None of the Duggan passages cited by the Examiner teaches the Margolin limitation(s).

 

In the Examiner’s Answer he accuses Margolin of trying to separate the Examiner’s 103 rejection into two 102 rejections. (Examiner’s Answer page 13, second full paragraph.) No, Margolin is not doing that. Margolin is objecting to the Examiner’s tactic that somehow, by combining the two references, an element that appears in neither one is magically brought into existence. If Margolin failed to contest the motivation to combine the two references it is because neither reference teaches the element(s) described above, so that combining the two references is irrelevant. See, for example,  Margolin Appeal: Page 15, line 13 - Page 21 line 33; Page 24, line 1 - Page 28, line 41; Page 29, line 13 - Page 34, line 13; Page 35, line 1 - Page 39, line 44. 

 


The Examiner further states in his Answer (Page 14, first full paragraph):

     Further, the appellant makes statements such as, "They certainly fail to make a primafacie case for rejection" instead of --They certainly fail to make a primafacie case of obviousness rejection--. Thus it is respectfully submitted that appellant is arguing a 102 rejection, which 102 rejection is not in the final office action under appeal. [1]

 

Margolin responds:

1.   Margolin was referring to the Examiner’s rejection, which was a 103 obviousness rejection;

2.   In another place Margolin did use the Examiner’s preferred magic phrase. See Margolin Appeal Brief Page 14, lines 31-32: “In the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection he failed to make a prima facie case of obviousness.”

 

 

C.  The Examiner asserts (Examiner’s Answer Page 13, second line from the bottom to Page 14, line 4):

As such the basis of the argument is not understood since appellant does not contest the motivation to combine references, but only insist that both US (5904724) and (US 2005004723) have been inappropriately used beyond the broadest possible interpretation. Appellant fails to provide any reason to support the statement that prior arts have been used beyond the broadest possible interpretation. At best the examiner can only assume that the appellant is making conclusory statements with no support.

 

{Emphasis added. The argument that the Examiner is referring to is his assertion that Margolin is attempting to divide the Examiner’s 103 rejection into two 102 rejections.}

 

Yes, the Examiner has used Margolin ‘724 and Duggan way beyond their broadest possible interpretation. He did this by denying Margolin the right to use the terms “civilian airspace” and “safety” as they are commonly used in the aerospace community. Margolin addressed this issue in his Appeal Brief on Page 41, line 1 - Page 46, line 18; and Page 46, line 21 - Page 48, line 15.

In brief, the Examiner waited until his second rejection to proclaim that Margolin had not defined the term “civilian airspace” or “safety” or a “particular level of safety.” As a result he defined the terms himself as meaning anything he wanted them to mean, which is why he asserted he had found them in both Margolin ‘724 and Duggan. Margolin pointed out in his Appeal Brief that the significance of the Examiner’s strategy in denying Margolin the common use of the terms can be found in Ex parte MAURICE GIVENS Appeal 2009-003414, BPAI Informative Decision, Decided August 6, 2009.  In other words, the Examiner was trying to get around ex parte MAURICE GIVENS.

 

The Examiner’s response to Margolin’s argument was, only by indirectly and non-responsively  saying, “At best the examiner can only assume that the appellant is making conclusory statements with no support.”

 

Margolin will note that the Examiner made the second rejection final and refused to allow Margolin the opportunity to respond to it.  Margolin did not have the opportunity to respond to these new grounds for rejection until his Appeal Brief.

 

 

D.  The Examiner makes the statement (Examiner’s Response, starting at Page 14, last paragraph):

     The examiner respectfully asserts that since the airspace in the prior art is referred to as any environment which the prior art aircraft can fly it implies that the prior art airspace is not restricted to any particular airspace. As such the prior art at least contemplates a civilian airspace as claimed. In addition, since the prior art indicates that the remote aircraft can be of any type e.g. flown by a RECREATIONAL ETHUSIAST the prior at least contemplates that the remote aircraft if flown in a civilian space.

 

Having failed to deny Margolin the meaning of the term “civilian airspace” as it is commonly understood in the aerospace community the Examiner is attempting to muddy the waters (or pollute the air) by using the term “RECREATIONAL ETHUSIAST.” Presumably, the Examiner  meant “Recreational Enthusiast.” In any event, it is irrelevant. If the military wants to use Margolin’s invention to safely fly their UAVs in their own (military) airspace they are free to do so. Margolin’s invention is directed to safely flying UAVs in civilian airspace because safely flying UAVs in civilian airspace (which includes safely sharing civilian airspace with other aircraft) was a long unmet need at the time Margolin made his invention, and it is still an unmet need as of the date of this Reply.

 


E.   The Examiner makes the statement (Examiner’s Answer, Page 15, first full paragraph):

     The examiner further respectfully asserts that a "synthetic vision system" has been interpreted as used in appellant's specification to refer to a 3-D vision system (appellants specification filed 4/17/2007, section 002). Appellant specification section 003 even admits that the prior art of record US (5904724) discloses a synthetic vision system as claimed.

 

The Examiner is attempting to create a controversy where none exists. Margolin’s current invention uses synthetic vision. He explicitly states in his application (Paragraph 002, Background of the Invention):

“Synthetic Vision” is the current term for three dimensional projected image data presented to the pilot or other observer.

 

Margolin also incorporates by reference his own patent (U.S. Patent 5,904,724) in Margolin Application Paragraph 003.

 

This is simply another attempt by the Examiner to avoid the real issues in this case.

 

 

F.  The Examiner makes the statement (Examiner’s Answer, Page 16, first full paragraph):

     Some of appellant's remarks are that the prior art do not recite the phrase, "safely flying an unmanned aerial vehicle in civilian airspace comprising: ...”. Appellant thus insists that the rejection is conclusory. The examiner disagrees and notes that any particular level of safety is not described or disclosed in the specification nor is there any meaning provided for "safety". It is believed that the aircraft flown in the prior art is flown with at least some safely since the pilot is required to practice flying the aircraft using a simulation 609. All aircraft pilots must go to school and practice before they are licensed to fly any aircraft be it civilian or military. In addition, the aircraft of the prior art at least anticipates the structure and operation of aircraft in the invention.

 

1.  The Examiner simply repeats his mantra,

The examiner disagrees and notes that any particular level of safety is not described or disclosed in the specification nor is there any meaning provided for "safety".

 

which is non-responsive to Margolin’s Appeal Brief (Page 46, line 21 - Page 48, line 15).

 

2.  The Examiner makes the extraordinary statement:

It is believed that the aircraft flown in the prior art is flown with at least some safely since the pilot is required to practice flying the aircraft using a simulation 609. All aircraft pilots must go to school and practice before they are licensed to fly any aircraft be it civilian or military.

 

The Examiner’s argument is nonsense. Practicing in a simulator does not guaranty safety in the real world. Would any member of this Board want to fly in a Boeing 747 whose pilots (all of the pilots), after extensive practice in a simulator, are making their first ever flight in an actual aircraft? Margolin wouldn’t.[2]

 

The Examiner has chosen to ignore the evidence. In Margolin’s Appeal Brief he quotes from a speech given by FAA Administrator Babbit in November 2009. From Margolin Appeal Brief, page 44, lines 24-32:

So if we are direct with ourselves here, as of today, unmanned aircraft systems are not ready for seamless or routine use yet in civilian airspace. The idea of pilots flying remotely has been around for a long time. And it is, I truly believe, the way of the future. But where we are, on numerous fronts, they’re not ready for open access to the NAS and we can’t give you the thumbs up.

 

Margolin’s definition of safety is consistent with the FAA Administrator’s definition, only the FAA Administrator’s definition is more eloquent.

 

From Margolin’s Application, paragraph 10:

[010]   It is important when flying a UAV in an airspace shared with other aircraft, both civilian and military, that collisions during all phases of flight (including taking off and landing) not happen.

 

FAA Administrator Babbitt’s definition is (Margolin Appeal Brief, Page 47, line 31 - Page 38, line 6):

Good afternoon, and thank you, John [Langford, Chairman & President, Aurora Flight Sciences]. It’s an exciting time in aviation and to be involved with introducing new technology into the National Airspace System. It’s also a good time to be thinking and talking about personal and professional responsibility — something I have unfortunately had to do too much of lately. But we all — every professional in aviation — have a shared

responsibility to make this system as absolutely as safe as it can be, and never to just a level where we would ever say, “We could do more, but this is safe enough”.

 

{Emphasis added}

 

Margolin’s Application claims priority from a Provisional Application filed April 19, 2006. At the time, Margolin’s invention filled a long unmet need. As of FAA Administrator Babbitt’s speech in 2009 the need was still unmet.

 

G.   The Examiner is attempting to mislead the Board into believing that Margolin agrees that the sections cited by the Examiner read on Margolin’s claims. From Examiner’s Answer, starting at page 15 last paragraph:

The examiner believes that appellant's claims were all addressed. Some of the claims are have similar limitations only that the wording in some of the claims is different. As such the examiner refers the appellant back to the rejection of the claims that are similar. Appellant took on this position to indicate that the claims were ignored. The examiner respectfully does not acquiesce to the allegations since the sections cited and quoted by appellant are believed to read on the claims. As such appellant's remarks citing MPEP 2143.03 is controversial since appellant has concurred that the examiner has cited sections that are believed the read on the claims. As such it is respectfully submitted that all claim limitations were considered.

 

{Emphasis added}

 

While the Examiner may believe that the sections he cited read on Margolin’s claims anyone who reads Margolin’s Response to the FOAM, Margolin’s Appeal Brief, or this Reply would know that Margolin does not agree with the Examiner. The Examiner’s attempt to mislead the Board into believing otherwise is desperate and offensive.

 

 

H.   The Examiner makes the statement (Examiner’s Answer, Page 16, second full paragraph):

Now appellant's appeal brief is 506 pages long. Most of the material submitted by appellant is irrelevant to the appeal to the board because the material was not provided to the examiner for consideration during prosecution of the case. Appellant is making remarks relying on documents that the examiner was never given an opportunity to review during prosecution of the case. As such the examiner respectfully submits that comments about such arguments related to the such documents are irrelevant to the appeal brief to the Board.

 

{Emphasis added}

 

The body of Margolin’s Appeal Brief is approximately 59 pages including the required Claims Appendix as well as an index of the Evidence Appendix. The Evidence Appendix contains 15 Exhibits taking an additional 446 pages.

 

Exhibit 1 - Exhibit 12 come from the Image File Wrapper, with the exception of Exhibit 2 (a reproduction of Margolin ‘724) and Exhibit 4 (a reproduction of Duggan), both cited by the Examiner. The index of Exhibit 1 - Exhibit 12 is reproduced here:

 

Exhibit 1     Patent Application as filed  ………………………………………..….…  61

Exhibit 2     U.S. Patent 5,904,724  ……………………………………………..…....  87

Exhibit 3     First Office Action on the Merits  ……………………………………...  102

Exhibit 4     U. S. Patent Application 20050004723 (Duggan) …………………….... 115

Exhibit 5     Applicant’s Response to First Office Action  …………………………..  193

Exhibit 6     Second Office Action  ………………………………………………...… 435

Exhibit 7     Applicant’s Summary of Telephone Interview with Examiner ……….... 452

Exhibit 8     Applicant’s Summary of Telephone Interview with Examiner’s SPE  … 457

Exhibit 9     IDS References Considered by Examiner  ..……………………………. 461

Exhibit 10               Sensing Requirements for Unmanned Air Vehicles, AFRL Air Vehicles

                    Directorate  ……………………………………………………………… 465 

Exhibit 11              Developing Sense and Avoid Requirements for Meeting An Equivalent

                   Level of Safety, Russel Wolfe ..………………………………………... 469

Exhibit 12              Article - Lockheed's Polecat UCAV Demonstrator Crashes, Aviation

                  Week & Space Technology, by Amy Butler, 03/19/2007, page 44 ......... 489

 

Margolin reproduced these exhibits in his Appeal Brief in order to satisfy the requirement of 37 CFR 41.37(c)(1)(ix):

(ix) Evidence appendix. An appendix containing copies of any evidence submitted pursuant to §§ 1.130, 1.131, or 1.132  of this title or of any other evidence entered by the examiner and relied upon by appellant in the appeal, along with a statement setting forth where in the record that evidence was entered in the record by the examiner. Reference to unentered evidence is not permitted in the brief. See § 41.33 for treatment of evidence submitted after appeal. This appendix may also include copies of the evidence relied upon by the examiner as to grounds of rejection to be reviewed on appeal.

 

By including Exhibit 1 - Exhibit 12 Margolin has made it unnecessary for the Board to waste time looking for them.

 

Exhibit 1 - Exhibit 12 occupy approximately 431 pages of the 446 page Evidence Appendix. That leaves 15 pages in Exhibit 13 - Exhibit 15, which will be discussed shortly. Yet the Examiner asserts:

Most of the material submitted by appellant is irrelevant to the appeal to the board because the material was not provided to the examiner for consideration during prosecution of the case. Appellant is making remarks relying on documents that the examiner was never given an opportunity to review during prosecution of the case.

 

Fifteen pages (Exhibit 13 - Exhibit 15) divided by 446 pages equals approximately 3.36% of the total number of pages in the Evidence Appendix.[3]  The Examiner has exaggerated 3.36% as being “Most of the material” which was not provided to him until Margolin’s Appeal Brief.[4]  

 

There is a very good reason that Exhibit 13 - Exhibit 15 were not introduced until Margolin’s Appeal Brief. In the Second Office Action (February 15, 2011) the Examiner expanded his grounds for rejection (constructively introducing additional grounds for rejection) and made the rejection final. In Margolin’s telephone interview with the Examiner, Margolin asked the Examiner to withdraw making the Office Action final so he could respond to the new grounds for rejection. The Examiner refused. Margolin discussed the situation with the Examiner’s SPE and was also refused.

 

In his Answer the Examiner failed to state which documents were new. His statement “Most of the material” is a gross untruth. He denied Margolin the opportunity to respond to the additional grounds for rejection he made in the Second Office Action and now that Margolin has had the opportunity to respond, the Examiner, instead of responding to the evidence, is asking the Board to ignore it.

 

Margolin is grateful to the Board for being allowed to respond to the Examiner’s new grounds for rejection by introducing Exhibit 13 - Exhibit 15.

 

However, if the Board changes its mind and decides to ignore Margolin’s new evidence then the Board must also strike all of the Examiner’s grounds for rejection and associated arguments and comments that made Exhibit 13 - Exhibit 15 necessary.

 

I.   The Examiner states (Examiner’s Answer, Page 15, second full paragraph):

     The appellant is a pro se and the office tried to help the appellant to explain how MPEP was interpreted to reject the claims. However, appellant in the reply to the first office action dated 9/01/2010 furnished a response that was 75 pages (see appellant's response dated 11/29/2010). When asked why he submitted such a large swath of pages that mostly were about appellants personal papers referring to appellant's rents, taxes, personal contracts, etc appellant responded that he is trying to be diplomatic by submitted such large swaths of irrelevant documents even though appellant's specification is only 16 pages.

 

Let’s take the first part:

The appellant is a pro se and the office tried to help the appellant to explain how MPEP was interpreted to reject the claims. 

 

By the “office” Margolin assumes the Examiner means himself and his SPE.

 

The Examiner’s explanation of MPEP was as clear and reasonable as how 3.36% of the material became “Most of the material.” supra.   

 

MPEP 1207.02 Contents of Examiner's Answer states:

    The examiner should furnish the appellant with a written statement in answer to the appellant's brief within 2 months after the receipt of the brief by the examiner.

 

Margolin’s Appeal Brief was forwarded to the Examiner on 6/28/2011. Two months from 6/28/2011 is 8/28/2011. The mailing date of the Examiner’s Answer is not until 9/14/2011. Either the Examiner’s understanding of MPEP is deficient or he thinks the rules don’t apply to him.

 

And now the second part, where the Examiner’s Straw Man is obviously a lunatic.

However, appellant in the reply to the first office action dated 9/01/2010 furnished a response that was 75 pages (see appellant's response dated 11/29/2010). When asked why he submitted such a large swath of pages that mostly were about appellants personal papers referring to appellant's rents, taxes, personal contracts, etc appellant responded that he is trying to be diplomatic by submitted such large swaths of irrelevant documents even though appellant's specification is only 16 pages.[5]

 

This goes beyond a mischaracterization of Margolin. Or even a gross mischaracterization. It is a mixture of outright, subtle, and prejudicial lies.

 

In Margolin’s Summary of Telephone Interview with the Examiner (Margolin Appeal Brief Exhibit 7, starting at 454, last paragraph) Margolin stated:

We moved on. I explained why I had discussed the Duggan application in such detail, starting with the fact that it had issued as a patent (U.S. Patent 7,343,232 Vehicle control system including related methods and components) on March 11, 2008, before the First Office Action. I also explained why I had introduced the extensive exhibit concerning the financial problems experienced by the Duggan Examiner. I explained that when I stated in my Response to the First Office Action that “Perhaps the Duggan Examiner was preoccupied with financial problems” I was being diplomatic. In fact, the evidence shows that the Duggan Examiner was either incompetent or may have committed misconduct. I explained to the Examiner that my reason for bringing up the subject was to show that the USPTO Office discriminates against pro se inventors. Aerospace Companies with expensive Law Firms are given a free pass, while pro se inventors get kicked in the head. I was not asking for a free pass, only to be treated fairly.

 

The documents of rents and taxes are not Margolin’s (“Appellant’s”). They are the rents and taxes of the Duggan Examiner. They show that the Duggan Examiner was experiencing substantial financial difficulties. The characterization of these documents as “irrelevant” was made by the Examiner, not by Margolin.

 

Let’s start at the beginning.

 

Margolin was already well familiar with the Duggan Application before the Examiner cited it in his First Office Action.[6]

 

In brief, Margolin discovered the Duggan Application not long after it was published. The claims, as filed, had substantial problems. For example, in Duggan claim 1 a term not only lacked an antecedent, the term was not defined in the Specification and did not have a commonly understood meaning.  Duggan claim 31 contained two periods. 

 

Margolin brought this to the attention of the small patent licensing company which was then representing Margolin’s patents.

 

The small patent licensing company brought it to the attention of Geneva Aerospace, the Assignee of the Duggan Application. One of the results was that Geneva Aerospace licensed Margolin ‘724 as well as U.S. Patent 5,566,073 Pilot Aid Using A Synthetic Environment also issued to Margolin. Margolin reproduced the license agreement (“personal contract”) in his Response to the First Office Action as evidence.

 

The Duggan Application was allowed as filed in its First Office Action, including the defective claims. The Duggan attorney had to ask the Duggan Examiner to use an Examiner’s Amendment to correct the punctuation in Duggan Claim 31.

Thus, Geneva Aerospace got a “free pass” for its patent application. (Margolin’s Examiner cited the Duggan Application even though the Duggan patent had been issued March 11, 2008 as U.S. Patent 7,343,232 Vehicle control system including related methods and components.)

 

Subsequently, Margolin discovered evidence that the material in the Duggan disclosure, as well as products based on the Duggan disclosure, had been publicly available for several years before the Duggan Application had been filed. See Margolin Appeal Brief Evidence Appendix Exhibit 5 starting at page 263, line 30.

 

To put it bluntly, in the current case the Examiner’s rejection in the First Office Action was a pro forma specious rejection of the kind frequently given to pro se applicants. Margolin had hoped that by discussing in detail the defects in the Duggan Application (and later patent) the Examiner would rethink his strategy and give Margolin’s application the fair and honest examination the Examiner is legally required to perform.

 

Instead, the Examiner has dug in his heels and is continuing to play the “pro se Bad” card and, unable to argue the case on its merits, is trying to persuade the Board that Margolin is a lunatic.

 

In addition, the Examiner and his SPE have shown no knowledge of the real aerospace world and should be removed from the case.

 

Conclusion

 

For the reasons stated above, Margolin respectfully requests that the final rejection by the Examiner be reversed and that the Examiner be instructed to issue a Notice of Allowance of all claims.

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

/Jed Margolin/

 

Jed Margolin

pro se inventor

October 21, 2011

(775) 847-7845

 


___________________________________________________________________________________

 

I hereby certify that this correspondence is being filed through the USPTO’s Electronic Filing System.

 

Date:   October 21, 2011                               Inventor's Signature:   /Jed Margolin/

 

                                                                                                            Jed Margolin

 



[1] This statement comes from an Examiner whose grammatical, spelling, and typographical errors  have sometimes made it difficult to determine what, exactly, he was trying to say.

 

[2] Even experience in the real world does not guaranty safety. There are still aircraft accidents, both civilian and military, when the aircraft are flown by experienced pilots.

[3]  Since the Examiner is obsessed with page counts Margolin will respond with page counts.

 

[4] While the Examiner might not have read Margolin’s Application and Margolin’s Response to the FOAM, they were provided to him.

[5] Again, the Examiner’s obsession with counting pages.

 

[6] Margolin’s discussion of Duggan is contained in Margolin’s Response to the First Office

  Action reproduced in Margolin’s Appeal Brief Evidence Appendix Exhibit 5 starting at page

  260.